

**CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 29 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

(Bulgaria)

63-15799

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.C. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V.A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (contd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union have expressed the wish to speak on items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agenda, and the representatives of the United Kingdom and of Italy have asked to speak on item 5(d). (ENDC/1/Add.3)

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation is compelled to express its regret that the discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3), which has been going on for many months, has not led to any positive results so far. This is all the more serious because the problem of the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, together with the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops to their national territory, is undoubtedly the basic and decisive measure of the first stage of general and complete disarmament. The negative results we have had so far are not in the least changed by the fact that in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments the positions of the two sides are close to each other, and this only because in regard to conventional armaments, except for nuclear delivery vehicles, the Soviet Union has accepted the principle of percentage reduction contained in the United States draft (ENDC/30).

The Czechoslovak delegation has already had the opportunity of speaking on these points. It has made a thorough analysis of the negotiations which have taken place so far, and drawn the appropriate conclusions. We have examined the drafts of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States from the standpoint of principle: namely, to what extent they correspond to our main task, which is the need to eliminate in the first place the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. This analysis led us to certain conclusions regarding the extent of the efforts exerted and the goodwill displayed by the participants in the negotiations in trying to bring their positions closer together and to achieve agreement, as well as regarding the wider mutual relationships which, in our opinion, are the true reasons why the Western Powers are unwilling to agree to decisive measures to eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war in the very first stage of disarmament.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Our task, in the first place, is to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, which is directly hanging over mankind. To do so, it is essential that in the disarmament process decisive and effective measures should be taken in the first place in the field of nuclear disarmament. An agreement to that effect would undoubtedly be welcomed by the peoples of the whole world with great relief and satisfaction.

However, a thoroughly objective analysis of the United States draft shows that, far from eliminating the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war in stage I of general and complete disarmament, it is exceedingly doubtful that it would reduce this possibility to any extent. What would be the situation if the United States draft was implemented? At the end of the first stage of disarmament - that is, at the end of three years - 70 per cent of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons would still remain, military bases on foreign territories would remain intact, and the huge, ever-growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would remain in all their magnitude. It is quite obvious that, with both sides having at the present time the most modern means of delivery of nuclear weapons, mainly missiles, a 30 per cent reduction in armaments cannot lead to a reduction of the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war, let alone its complete elimination.

The existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons have already reached a size several times in excess of what some Western writers are accustomed to call "overkill capacity". I should like to quote, for example, the words of just one prominent American, Mr. R.E. Lapp, who, in his book "Kill and Overkill", writes that the destructive power of the United States nuclear reserves -

(continued in English)

"has now gone well beyond 30,000 megatons, and Secretary of State Rusk has estimated that by 1966, at the present rate, the stockpile may double that figure." (page 146).

(continued in Russian)

Any further comment would clearly be superfluous, but perhaps we should merely add that at the present time the stockpile of atom bombs in the United States alone is so huge that there are ten tons of explosive for every inhabitant of this globe!

The nuclear danger threatening mankind calls for urgent, energetic and effective disarmament measures; but these are not to be found in the United States draft, which provides for a percentage reduction of armaments in stage I.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak delegation is therefore profoundly convinced that, since the Western Powers are not prepared to agree to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, to the cessation of their production and to the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons in the first stage of the disarmament process, the only remaining way to put an end to the threat of a nuclear war is to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and at the same time to liquidate military bases on foreign territory and to withdraw all troops stationed abroad, as proposed by the Soviet Union.

As a result of the implementation of the Soviet draft, by the end of the first stage of general and complete disarmament the danger of a nuclear surprise attack would disappear, and the danger of the outbreak of a war with the use of conventional armaments would also be substantially reduced. Any unbiased person is bound to come to the conclusion that the Soviet draft, and not that of the United States, gives a positive answer to the question of how the threat of thermonuclear war can be eliminated right from the start of the disarmament process.

But the delegations of the NATO countries, during many months of discussion of the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, both in this Committee and in the forum of the United Nations, have stubbornly refused to recognize the unquestionable advantages of the Soviet draft. They have persistently tried to find weak points in the position of the socialist countries, and have piled up all sorts of arguments in support of their view. Let us take a look at least at some of these.

The main argument which the Western delegations have repeated in various forms has been the objection that, as a result of the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons simultaneously with the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops, the so-called "balance of forces" would be upset and the socialist countries left with a great superiority in so-called conventional armed forces. This was concisely expressed by the representative of Canada in the Committee on 15 May, when he said:

"... NATO, as a defensive alliance, would be broken up completely under the terms of the Soviet first-stage measures." (ENDC/PV.132, p.22)

But what is the situation in reality? In the field of nuclear weapons, as the result of the destruction of their means of delivery both sides would be placed in a completely equal position. Likewise, in the field of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces, during the first stage a reduction to the same level would take

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

place on both sides. Furthermore, as the result of the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, particularly intercontinental and global missile weapons, from the military standpoint the United States would even re-establish its previous invulnerability, which it had until recently.

Equally unfounded are the arguments regarding so-called geographical factors, in particular the assertion that as a result of the implementation of the Soviet proposals the United States would be separated from its allies in Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, and in the event of a conflict would be unable to come to their aid. But the Soviet Union would also have to ensure the defence of the whole of its territory, including the Asian part of the USSR, with the armed forces it would retain after the completion of stage I of disarmament. It is interesting to note that, when the Western delegations refer to geographical factors, for some obscure reason they omit to mention that in the post-war years, in addition to concluding a number of bilateral military treaties, they have established around the borders of the socialist countries an interconnected system of aggressive pacts starting from Canada and Greenland and ending with Japan. And if they point out the difficulties involved in transoceanic transport, their military leaders know quite well that the transfer, if necessary, of armed forces in the Soviet Union would be, from the standpoint of transportation, just as difficult on the whole as the transfer of United States units across the ocean to Europe.

What is the situation with regard to the superiority of the socialist countries in armed forces, on which so much emphasis is placed? We commend to your attention various specialized Western military sources, including the publications of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, which arrive at completely different conclusions. Moreover it is clear that during the disarmament process armed forces will be reduced to an equal extent on both sides so that neither side will gain any military advantage.

The delegations of the Western Powers also very frequently emphasize the need to preserve the so-called "balance of forces". As is clear from the military arguments of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, and his Western allies, their conception of the balance of forces includes retaining military bases on foreign territories, as well as retaining for the NATO member States the material possibility of delivering a nuclear blow according to their own choosing, of which I will speak later at the end of my statement. Their "balance of forces" theory has nothing to do with disarmament negotiations, and that is why we firmly reject it. It is nothing but a screen designed

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to cover up the continuation of the nuclear armaments race, as we can now see with our own eyes. It is also fundamentally at variance with one of the basic agreed principles in accordance with which our disarmament negotiations should be conducted: the principle of ensuring equal security for all the parties to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/5).

For some time in the course of our discussions the delegations of the NATO countries have also objected that no distinction should be made between means of delivery capable of delivering to a target exclusively conventional charges, and those capable of delivering to a target both conventional and nuclear charges. The socialist delegations have already emphasized here that in their view a satisfactory solution would be an approach whereby all types of weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads should be considered as potential means of delivery of nuclear weapons; from the military standpoint this could be defined very accurately.

Many of the arguments put forward by our Western colleagues during the discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agenda were also connected with the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. How many efforts have been made by the Western delegations to prove that the practical implementation of the Soviet proposals could not be controlled! They asked, for example, what would happen in the case of "arms hidden under the jacket", to use a certain expression employed by the United Kingdom delegation---that is, if concealment of a certain number of means of delivery or secret production of such weapons took place.

Under the Soviet draft, representatives of the international disarmament organization would be directly on the spot to control both the destruction of all types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the dismantling of factories or parts of factories engaged in their production. This conception of control over the elimination of delivery vehicles is fully in keeping with the requirement that the scope and nature of control should correspond exactly to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures to be carried out.

As for the fear that one of the sides might conceal a few isolated means of delivery of nuclear weapons, this applies in equal measure to both sides. But this should not stand in the way of our endeavours to reach agreement on the adoption of decisive measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. Furthermore, we have shown

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quite clearly that as a result of the possible concealment of a few missiles with nuclear warheads a potential aggressor would gain nothing. Even in the event of their use, he would not win a war, but would draw upon himself condign punishment on the part of the other States parties to the treaty.

Lastly, the possibility itself of concealing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and in particular their clandestine production, would be technically very difficult and therefore unlikely. This is also confirmed in a certain sense in paragraphs 12 and 13 of document ENDC/53 submitted in August 1962 by the United Kingdom delegation on the elimination of rockets as nuclear delivery vehicles, although I must emphasize that in regard to that document we have objections in principle.

The delegations of the socialist countries have indeed made enormous efforts to meet the views of the delegations of the countries members of NATO on the elimination of delivery vehicles, and to achieve agreement. In particular I would refer to the well-known compromise proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional p. 38-40) (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art . 5) that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain on their national territories an agreed, strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft defence missiles in the ground-to-air category until the end of stage II of general and complete disarmament. That proposal would not give the States concerned the means of waging an aggressive war. At the same time, however, it would give them possibilities of defence if any of the States should try to use concealed missiles.

The Soviet Union has also taken into account the objections of the delegations of the NATO countries that under the original Soviet draft (ENDC/2) the duration of stage I would allegedly be too short for the implementation of the measures envisaged, and has extended the duration of the first stage to twenty-four months from the date of signature of the treaty.

Representatives have already spoken here about the reactions of the Western Powers to that new Soviet compromise proposal on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. After their first confused reaction at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, they adopted a negative attitude towards the proposal. They did not even change their attitude when in March 1963 the socialist countries, having considered their further objections on the subject of control, agreed that the nuclear missile vehicles retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage should be subject to international control directly at the launching sites where they are located. (ENDC/PV.114, p.40)

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The discussion in this Committee of items 5(b) and 5(c) has shown the very peculiar approach of the delegations of the NATO countries to the very concept of negotiation. Although the socialist countries have made repeated moves towards the position of the NATO countries, these Powers have not given up one iota of their original proposal, which is unacceptable because it would not solve the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war; and in addition they are demanding further concessions from the socialist countries.

Instead of discussing the Soviet draft from the standpoint of principle, they want to sidetrack the negotiations by putting forward various technical questions which, in our view, can only be discussed after agreement has been reached on questions of principle. They are doing so despite the fact that the socialist countries, and particularly the delegation of the Soviet Union, have answered all their questions concerning the substance of the Soviet draft (A/PV.1127, provisional p. 38-40) submitted to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Much to our regret, we are compelled to state most emphatically that this peculiar and one-sided approach of the representatives of the NATO countries cannot lead to agreement. Serious negotiations require that all the participants should display an equal measure of goodwill, a willingness to achieve agreement through reasonable compromises in accordance with the method of "give and take", which the representative of India recommended at our meeting of 8 May (ENDC/PV.129, p.16).

The analysis of the questions included in items 5(b) and 5(c) which has been carried out by the delegation of Czechoslovakia--as well as by the delegations of the other socialist countries--leads to the conclusion that the true reason why no agreement has been reached in the negotiations so far is not alleged shortcomings in the Soviet proposals or problems of control, but the lack of readiness on the part of the NATO countries to set about decisive and urgent measures in the field of disarmament. The representatives of the NATO countries in this Committee do not like it when the representatives of the socialist countries point out that the actual policies of the Governments of the NATO countries are quite contrary to what their representatives here would have us believe.

I have already mentioned what the NATO countries are striving for in proclaiming the "balance of forces" theory. I hope that the United States representative will not regard it as propaganda if I recall the words of the Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara,

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

when he spoke on 22 February 1963 in the United States Senate Armed Services Sub-Committee about the position of the United States on the question of disarmament. With extraordinary candour Mr. McNamara stated:

(continued in English)

"... my position is a very simple one on disarmament or arms control: I think we should engage in such agreements if and when, and only if and when, we can do so without reducing our power advantage".

(Military Procurements Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964, page 380, published by United States Congress)

(continued in Russian)

That, then, is the true gist of the United States position, and that is the true reason why the delegations of the United States and its allies do not wish to accept the proposals for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Here is the confirmation that the demand of the Western delegations regarding the need to preserve the "balance of forces" is merely intended to cover up their striving to acquire military superiority. This is precisely the criterion that determines the position of the United States on disarmament questions, and not at all the interests of the peoples, which demand the adoption of decisive measures in the field of disarmament. This is the main reason why our negotiations are producing no positive results.

We have no other alternative, nor is it propaganda, when we assert that the United States and its allies are opposing the adoption of effective and decisive measures in the field of disarmament because they want to retain the possibility of delivering a nuclear blow when they decide to do so. That this is actually so was recently confirmed by Mr. McNamara in the aforementioned statement of 22 February 1963 in the United States Senate. He said:

(continued in English)

"... First, let me say that we have stated many, many times - I have stated on several different occasions, I stated it in Germany, I have stated it on three occasions I can recall in this country - that we will use whatever weapons are necessary to protect our interests, including nuclear weapons."
(ibid, p.382)

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

(continued in Russian)

It is indeed noteworthy that an official Government leader of the United States should state so bluntly that the United States will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons to protect its interests. But what are these interests, and what would be the danger to peace and security in various parts of the world if they were fulfilled? There is obviously no need to elaborate on that here. For the sake of these selfish interests of the United States, Mr. McNamara would not hesitate to plunge the world into the abyss of a global thermonuclear war.

The interests of security of the peoples and the maintenance of peace throughout the world categorically require that the governments of all countries should make sincere efforts to reach agreement in the field of disarmament and to lessen international tension. In no case is it possible to speak of disarmament and at the same time to accelerate the armaments race.

We should like to hope that sober reason and a sense of reality will triumph in the end with the leaders of the NATO countries as well. We hope that these countries will change their negative position in regard to the question of disarmament, and will reconsider their present negative attitude towards the proposals of the socialist countries for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the interconnected liquidation of military bases, and the withdrawal of foreign troops, and in this way facilitate the achievement of progress in our negotiations.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translated from French): The discussion in our Committee in recent weeks on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles has been instructive in throwing a new light not only on the concrete proposals submitted concerning this subject, but also on the approach of the parties to certain general problems affecting the method of implementing the disarmament plans.

During the discussion the Polish delegation has had occasion to explain its point of view on some aspects of these problems. I should like now to attempt to draw the conclusions which in our opinion emerge from the whole exchange of views that we have just had. I think that there are certain questions which should be brought into perspective, and we should also learn the lessons that may be helpful when we come to discuss other problems raised by the application of the principle of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Disarmament is a process whose forms and methods of application are determined by their relation to the proposed objective. Now, we are all agreed in stating that our objective is the elimination of the material possibilities of waging war and the establishment of international peace on solid foundations.

That conception of disarmament therefore presupposes loyalty to certain guiding principles capable of making it a reality with the maximum efficacy. We can see that the negotiations which have taken place so far have led to the adoption of a number of such principles. They are to be found in the resolutions of the General Assembly, in the principles agreed for the negotiations on disarmament in September 1961 (ENDC/5), and in certain general provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament accepted by our Committee. We should not underestimate the value and the importance of the agreements reached. They represent the fruit of long discussions, the outcome of a confrontation of ideas which, it is surely true to say, has left visible traces on the thinking of all the parties. They also testify to the fact that a rapprochement of positions is possible.

We must also, however, note that the path we still have to tread is a long one. Important questions of principle still divide us, and it is plain that if we want to succeed in our task we must find a solution to these questions.

We are still in disagreement about the approach to the consequences of recent advances in the field of armaments. The Western Powers are still not prepared to accept the obvious fact that the nuclear weapon is not a weapon like any other, that the atomic bomb is not merely an explosive charge with a power multiplied by A, and that missiles are not merely artillery shells with a range multiplied by B. They still refuse to admit that the advent of the atomic era and the perfecting of ballistic missiles have introduced fresh elements into international life which must be taken into account if the problem of disarmament is to be solved rationally and effectively. We still come up against their refusal to begin the disarmament process with the neutralization of the weapons which in the present situation are the most dangerous, namely atomic weapons and their means of delivery.

For our part we are convinced that the nature of the nuclear weapon calls for the application of new disarmament methods. In the past, perhaps, it was possible to expect a quantitative reduction of certain armaments to produce some effects. In the past, the reduction and limitation, for instance, of the number of submarines, aircraft

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

and so on could reduce the risk of war. The nature of those weapons did not rule out in advance the possibilities of introducing a certain regulation of the armaments race.

All this, however, is no longer valid now. The perfecting of the nuclear weapons and of its means of delivery has radically changed all the elements of the problem. A mere reduction in the number of these weapons, as proposed by the Western Powers, is not enough, because in the first place it would create only the illusion of disarmament while leaving in the hands of the nuclear Powers considerable means of destruction, and in the second place because the power of the atomic bomb already vastly exceeds whatever might be rationally used in the event of hostilities.

What are needed now are measures which from the outset of the disarmament process would neutralize the nuclear weapon and make its use impossible. We have proposed the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. And, in the light of the objections of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union has proposed that there should remain at the disposal of the United States and of the Soviet Union, exclusively in their own territories and until the end of the second stage of disarmament, a strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles and certain anti-missile and ground-to-air defences.

As we have said before, the Gromyko plan (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) is based on the same concern for averting the danger of a nuclear war from the very beginning of the disarmament process. The possession of a number of missiles by the nuclear Powers during the first and second stages of disarmament in no way changes that situation. The quantity of missiles which the Soviet Union proposes should be left in the hands of the nuclear Powers would have to be strictly limited. A country wishing to utilize them for aggressive purposes would have to bear in mind the retaliatory power and defensive means of its opponent. And, lastly, a control of these missiles would be instituted at the launching sites (ENDC/PV.114, p.40).

During our discussions our Western colleagues advanced in support of their point of view a whole series of arguments, prominent among which is that concerning the balance of forces --the premise concerning the need to ensure the security of States--, and also the contention that the disarmament process should begin with the execution of relatively modest measures.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I should like first to say that in our opinion the concern to ensure the security of States and the concern to maintain the balance of forces are mutually exclusive. On many occasions we have shown that the search for a balance of forces can but justify the speeding up of the armaments race, and that under present conditions, which are characterized by the ever-increasing importance of weapons of mass destruction in the strategy of the great Powers, it is in fact incompatible with a genuine concern for true security.

Our Western colleagues attempt to resolve this contradiction by adopting a very odd concept of security. According to them, security lies, not in the ability to safeguard the means of defence, in proportion, naturally, to the general level of armaments throughout the world which would be maintained in the different stages of disarmament, nor in the system of collective action provided for by the United Nations Charter in the event of aggression, but rather in the capacity to resort to force and to impose one's will by force.

That is the main reason accounting for the attitude adopted by the Western Powers towards the problem of the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It also explains the imbalance discernible between the so-called defence means they wish to retain and the weapons which are really necessary for their security. One does not have to be a great military expert to understand that the arsenals which the Western Powers would like to maintain during the first two stages of disarmament greatly exceed any defence needs and have no part in any truly defensive strategy.

I should like now to say a few words about the criticism that the Soviet plan provides in the first stage for excessively radical measures. Our Western colleagues seem to think that, in view of the difficulties of disarmament, the international tension and existing distrust between the Powers, more modest measures should be taken at the beginning. As I see it, such a point of view disregards the capital importance of the first step to be taken along the road to disarmament. It is on that that the scope and direction of the disarmament process as a whole depend. Under our disarmament plan, each measure creates a qualitatively new situation which sets the lines to be followed and conditions the subsequent disarmament measures. If we wish to eliminate the possibilities of waging war, we must first tackle the most dangerous form of war, namely nuclear war. The degree of danger represented at present by war waged with weapons of mass destruction should determine the extent of the disarmament measures to be taken in the first stage.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In our disarmament plan, the course that we wish to follow in the field of non-nuclear disarmament is the logical consequence of our approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Thus all the measures fall within a logical, coherent framework. The same, however, cannot be said of the plan submitted by the Western delegations. Their proposals for the first stage not only do not eliminate, they do not even reduce, the possibilities of nuclear war. It is obvious that this must affect the efficacy and scope of disarmament measures in other fields. For, from the point of view of the premises of general and complete disarmament, what can be the practical sense of reducing conventional weapons if the Powers are left with the possibility of waging war with nuclear weapons?

The Polish delegation takes the view that the problem of the initial measures of disarmament cannot be considered from the point of view of difficulties of a technical nature, particularly since, contrary to our Western colleagues' contention, these alleged technical difficulties, particularly those relating to control, would not really be lessened by the application of the Western plan. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance, for the future work of our Committee and the success of its negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, of the solution of the problem of eliminating the danger of an atomic war from the start of the disarmament process. Patently, if we can reach agreement on this point, everything else will be comparatively easy to settle.

In the course of these negotiations, the socialist countries offered several alternatives to the Western Powers. They proposed beginning either with the elimination of nuclear weapons, or with that of the means of delivering such weapons. They finally decided in favour of the neutralization of nuclear weapons through the destruction of delivery vehicles in the first stage, because that method offers certain advantages over the immediate elimination of atomic weapons. Another reason was that it reflected ideas which appeared to be supported by some Western statesmen. Lastly, in the light of the discussions in our Committee last year, the Soviet Union modified its proposals on the method of elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles when it submitted the Gromyko plan.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

We have to note regretfully that up to now all our efforts have been in vain. The Western delegations still maintain opinions which they know to be completely unacceptable, and the attitude they have adopted towards the Gromyko plan unfortunately leaves little reason for hope. We are ending this stage of our discussions with a negative result which is bound to influence the consideration of other problems. It must be noted that the Western Powers are in fact rejecting the principle of the equality of the parties in the course of the disarmament process, that they are still adhering to the concept of the balance of forces in sacrificing the principle of the balance of security for all, that they are endeavouring by the device of percentage reductions to retain intact their military potential, and that their concept of the problem of control is still anchored to the theory of control of armaments rather than control of disarmament.

Nevertheless the Polish delegation believes that, despite the fundamental differences dividing us today, agreement is possible. We are convinced that eventually the interests of mankind will prevail over the obstinacy of all those who refuse to learn the lessons of history and who believe that they can indefinitely cling to positions which in the world of today have become an anachronism.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The discussion which has taken place in the Committee on the Soviet proposal for the elimination in stage I of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons except for a strictly limited and agreed number of missiles of certain types and categories to be retained only by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of stage II of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, arts. 5-8) has, to our great regret, produced no results so far because of the position taken by the Western Powers. Nevertheless, this discussion has had a certain positive significance, because it has revealed the real attitude of the Western Powers to any proposals aimed at the speediest possible elimination of the danger of a nuclear missile war. The discussion of this Soviet proposal has shown the negative attitude of the Western Powers towards it, an attitude which cannot fail to cause us serious concern with regard to fulfilling the task entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly of preparing a treaty on general and complete disarmament (A/Res/1767(XVII), ENDC/64), and with regard to the fate of our negotiations in general.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The need to initiate disarmament in such a way as to eliminate at the very outset the threat of a devastating nuclear missile war which is hanging over mankind was clearly recognized by the majority of States when we first assembled around this table. In the light of the extraordinary events of the recently-experienced international crisis in the Caribbean area, when the world was literally on the brink of a world-wide nuclear missile war, this became even clearer and more obvious. But unfortunately the Western statesmen have short memories. In October 1962, when as a result of its aggressive actions the United States aggravated the situation in the Caribbean to the point that there arose an international crisis which placed the world on the brink of a world-wide nuclear missile war, in those ominous days when the death-dealing breath of that war could be felt coming nearer every minute, when the peoples of the world were gazing upwards with eyes full of agonizing anxiety that something inevitable and irreparable was about to happen -- the Western leaders, having realized the terrible imminence of a deadly war, began to talk with one voice about the need to reduce international tension and to improve relations between East and West, and about the need for disarmament and the adoption of measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war. But the Caribbean crisis passed, and the enlightenment it had brought about in people's minds disappeared; and as is evident from the decisions of the Ottawa session of the NATO Council, the Western Powers have even intensified the nuclear armaments race and are taking steps to intensify the conventional armaments race as well. Their preparations for war have become even more intensive.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are striving for the implementation of a wide programme of measures aimed at eliminating the possibility of a nuclear conflict right at the beginning of disarmament. Of course, the most radical way of solving this problem would be the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their removal from the armaments of States, together with the destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of production of such weapons in the first stage of disarmament. As is well known, however, the Western Powers were firmly opposed to this. They refused to accept the Soviet Union's proposal.

Taking into account this position of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, being anxious to safeguard mankind from the threat of a nuclear missile war, proposed a different approach to the solution of this problem. Leaving aside for the time being, that is in stage I of disarmament, the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the

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Soviet Union proposed that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be destroyed in this stage (ENDC/2/Rev.1). The meaning of this proposal was perfectly clear to everyone: namely, to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war as early as stage I of disarmament while at the same time retaining in the arsenals and depots of the nuclear Powers all their accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

On this point we clearly moved towards meeting the position of the Western Powers. But at the same time everyone understands that nuclear warheads without the means of delivery cannot be used for military purposes. They would, to the great happiness of mankind, remain idle in their depots. For this purpose the draft treaty submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the Soviet Union proposes to begin disarmament with the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, from powerful intercontinental missiles to artillery systems capable of firing nuclear charges. The complete elimination of the means of delivery in the first stage, without eliminating the nuclear weapons themselves, would in fact be a guarantee that the world would be saved from a nuclear war.

There is yet another positive aspect to this Soviet proposal. The elimination of missiles, bombers, surface vessels and submarines capable of serving as a means of delivering nuclear weapons, and the cessation of their production, would very substantially sap the military power of States, and consequently would reduce the danger of war in general.

The elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons must be closely linked to the elimination of bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories. The interdependence of both these measures -- that is, elimination of the means of delivery and of military bases on foreign territories -- is fully in keeping with the requirements of the agreed basic principles for disarmament negotiations approved by the General Assembly (ENDC/5).

According to these principles, disarmament must be implemented in such a way that no State or any group of States could gain military advantage. It is well known that the Soviet Union has been compelled for a number of reasons to base its defence mainly on the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Our powerful global and intercontinental missiles were a sort of reply of the Soviet Union to the ring of military bases deployed by the United States and its NATO allies around the Soviet Union and other socialist States.

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The Soviet Union, in proposing the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including, of course, all types of rockets -- that is, its basic means of defence -- quite rightly demands that the other side should also take adequate, that is equal, measures to reduce the threat to its security. That is why the Soviet Union proposes that, together with the means of delivery, all foreign military bases on the territory of other States should also be eliminated. The United States representative has never explained how it is possible to ensure correct, balanced disarmament measures if foreign military bases and foreign troops remain completely intact on the territory of other States. The representatives of the Western Powers have been at great pains to defend their position with regard to these bases.

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, have expounded before the Committee their militarist conceptions with which they try to justify the Western Powers' refusal to eliminate their bases on foreign territories and to substantiate the need for their retention. They have told us that the United States needs its bases in Europe, Africa, Asia and everywhere else in order to be better placed to deliver nuclear blows to the Soviet Union and its allies. Their other explanation was that they needed military bases thousands of miles from the United States in order to keep their military alliances -- NATO, CENTO and SEATO -- from disintegrating.

In this clinging of the United States and the United Kingdom to bases outside their own territories could also be seen the habit of approaching the determination of their interests from the standpoint of colonial Powers which in order to maintain their domination have been relying, along the whole perimeter of their world-wide colonial empires, on systems of military bases located far beyond their own boundaries. The remnants of such a colonial and imperialistic policy can be seen in such places as Malta, Aden, Cyprus, Singapore, Hong Kong, Porto Rico, Guantanamo and many other points of the globe.

The position taken by our Western partners is not in keeping with the urgent tasks set before the participants in these negotiations by the whole course of international developments.

The Soviet Union, taking into account the present international situation and the experience of the international crisis in the Caribbean area, as well as the demands of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the world, proposes that in the first stage

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of disarmament such measures should be carried out as would make a nuclear missile war practically impossible and would substantially reduce the threat of war in general. Among such measures for the first stage of disarmament the Soviet Union includes the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons except for a strictly limited, agreed number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage, the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, the withdrawal of foreign troops, a substantial reduction of armed forces, and a 30 per cent reduction of all conventional armaments.

The discussion in the Committee of the Soviet and United States proposals for the first stage of disarmament in regard to the means of delivery of nuclear weapons has shown that the Soviet proposals are aimed at solving the main, key problem of our time -- the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Unless this problem is solved it is impossible to speak seriously of eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war. On this issue the Western Powers still cling to their proposals (ENDC/30, Corr.1, ENDC/30/ Add. 1 and 2) for a 30 per cent reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage, leaving at the disposal of States 70 per cent of all armaments. Under their proposals military bases and troops on foreign territories would remain intact. Moreover, the Western representatives have resorted to all kinds of devices, fantasies and hollow speculations in order to provide some sort of basis for their assertion that for technical reasons it is at present impossible to eliminate completely all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament and that it is only possible to reduce them by 30 per cent, while 70 per cent would have to be retained.

In this connexion I should like to dwell on the following three points. Against the Soviet proposal for the elimination in the first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons except for a strictly limited number of missiles to be retained until the end of the second stage only by the Soviet Union and the United States, the United States puts forward its own proposal for the first stage, namely a 30 per cent reduction of armaments. This approach of the United States is unsatisfactory and unacceptable.

In the first place, it does not solve the problem of eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war. Secondly, the United States proposal for the first stage of disarmament providing for a 30 per cent reduction of all armaments including the

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means of delivery of nuclear weapons and global and intercontinental missiles -- which are, as we know, the main element in the defence system of the Soviet Union -- but not providing for the elimination of the foreign military bases on the territories of other States with which the Western Powers have surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, is incompatible with paragraph 5 of the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5). These proposals are not in keeping with the basic provision of the Agreed Principles which states:

"... at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all". (ENDC/5, p.2)

Thirdly, this approach of the United States is obsolete and is not in keeping with the conditions of today. The point is that with the appearance of nuclear weapons, there also appeared the means of delivery such as missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads in the negaton range to any point of the globe within a matter of minutes. That is why it is quite wrong when in its disarmament proposals the United States proposes one and the same approach both in regard to missiles and to conventional armaments, namely, a 30 per cent reduction in both cases in the first stage of disarmament. It is necessary to understand that the solution to the problem of eliminating or at least substantially reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war requires imperatively the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Western plan for a percentage reduction of armaments is aimed at retaining nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and at retaining foreign military bases on the territories of other States; in fact it is a plan for retaining wide possibilities for unleashing a nuclear missile war at any moment. This plan would not put an end to the armaments race. The danger of a nuclear war is an inevitable concomitant of the United States plan. Not only we, but also the representatives of the non-aligned countries, and even of Western countries, have given repeated warnings about the dangerous consequences of a so-called percentage reduction of armaments. It suffices to recall in this connexion, the words of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, when he said:

"The problem of disarmament today does not lie in 10, 15, 20 or 25 per cent reductions. As long as the danger of such a war persists, it is immaterial in what proportion

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we reduce armaments, because this sort of war, as shown by the statistical data, will not really require all the thousands of thermonuclear bombs now at the disposal of the nuclear Powers. One quarter of the existing nuclear bombs would be sufficient to destroy the world or to obliterate any country from the face of the earth".

As a matter of fact the same point was made by the well-known British scientist and writer, Mr. Blackett. In his book, A Study of War, he writes:

"The number of nuclear weapons, their destructive power, and the variety of delivery means on both sides, are so great that no modest step in nuclear disarmament can have any great and decisive military significance".

In refusing to set about doing away with nuclear missile war through the speediest elimination of the means of nuclear delivery weapons, the Western Powers have used as a cover the argument that the implementation of the Soviet proposals on this question provides no guarantee that some State will not conceal a certain number of missiles or other means of delivery and use them to obtain substantial military advantages.

Thus, on 10 August 1962, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, referred to this as the main difficulty preventing the Western Powers from accepting the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.68, p.44 et seq). But these fears of the Western Powers are clearly unfounded; they are purely artificial. It would not be at all difficult to detect intercontinental missiles and, even less, to detect the factories producing them; it is not like looking for a needle in a haystack. We have already pointed out the technical characteristics of missiles, their great size, their complicated control systems, and so on. Their production requires a highly specialized and widely developed up-to-date industry. Under the Soviet proposal, it would be much easier for the inspectors of the international organization to verify fulfilment of the obligations of States to eliminate their means of delivery than it would be for States to conceal missiles or the factories producing them. The control we propose covers practically everything: factories, aerodromes, ports and launching sites, without which none of the presently known means of delivery of nuclear weapons can exist. The groundlessness of the arguments of the Western Powers

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regarding the possibility of concealing means of delivery is obvious; nevertheless they still cling to their position, thereby blocking all progress in the negotiations on this question.

In order to move the solution of disarmament questions out of the deadlock, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the retention by the United States and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and missiles in the ground-to-air category until the end of stage II. This new Soviet Union initiative, which opens up possibilities for working out a mutually acceptable, agreed solution of the question of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament, met with a wide measure of approval both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I venture to recall certain statements. The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. El-Zayyat, speaking on 20 December 1962 said:

"We have had occasion to welcome this Soviet move in the General Assembly. We have expressed previously our conviction that our work in this Committee will not lead us anywhere unless and until the two parties move away from their positions and towards a mutual agreement. We should like, therefore, to welcome again here this Soviet step forward". (ENDC/PV.95, p.16)

The Soviet proposal was also supported in the Committee at that time by the representatives of Brazil, Ethiopia, Nigeria and other countries. After the Committee had thoroughly discussed this question, the representative of India, Mr. Lall, spoke favourably of the Soviet proposal and recognized:

"... that it contains possibilities ... to move us further forward in the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles".

(ENDC/PV.129, p.18)

In order to help the Western Powers to determine more quickly their position with regard to the Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union has given in this Committee the necessary clarifications regarding the principles involved in the questions concerned. First, we elucidated in detail the question of the types and purposes of the missiles which we consider should be retained. We pointed out that they should be intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft defence missiles in the ground-to-air category.

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This was not a random listing. In retaining intercontinental ballistic missiles, our intention is to provide precisely those additional security guarantees about which the representatives of the Western Powers have had so much to say. It was also to meet the views of the Western Powers that we proposed the retention of anti-missile missiles and of anti-aircraft defence missiles. If they really fear that someone, in violation of the treaty, might conceal a certain number of missiles or adapt existing civilian aircraft for purposes of aggression, they are now given a reliable possibility of protecting their security through the retention of missiles capable of destroying such weapons in flight.

On 22 May, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said that:

"... the Soviet proposal ... appears to be designed to change in favour of the Soviet Union the residual mix of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles by calling for the elimination of those means of delivery on which the West has come to rely more than the Soviet Union, and for the retention of those delivery means on which the Soviet Union appears to place primary reliance". (ENDC/PV.135, p.29)

The lack of foundation of this assertion of the United States representative is quite obvious.

It is not only the Soviet Union that possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles. As the Western representatives have repeatedly told us, missiles of this kind are to be found in the armoury of the United States as well. The Western Powers possess missiles of other types and categories too. We propose that these missiles should be retained both by the Soviet Union and by the United States in agreed numbers -- I emphasize -- in agreed numbers.

In that case, how can one talk about the balance being upset to the advantage of the Soviet Union? We should like to have an answer to this question.

We have expressed our views on the criteria by which we should be guided in determining the number of missiles to be retained. The Soviet Union considers that a strictly limited, agreed number of missiles should be retained. We propose that the main criterion by which we should be guided in determining the number of missiles to be retained is that this number must be minimal, so that while providing an additional guarantee against aggression -- the main guarantee will lie in the disarmament measures themselves and the more extensive these measures, the greater will be the guarantees

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afforded States against aggression -- these missiles could not at the same time serve the purposes of war and the accomplishment of aggressive designs. The number of missiles to be retained should be subordinated to the need for such a guarantee against either side violating the peace and its obligations under a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

If the Western Powers agree to this principle, we should not have any great difficulty in working out together specific figures for the number of missiles to be left at the disposal of the United States and the Soviet Union. We are prepared to hear the views of the Western Powers on the number of missiles to be retained.

On 8 May the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy said that they could not be satisfied with the explanations given by the Soviet Union on the number of missiles to be retained. Mr. Stelle, for instance, said that it was not yet clear to him in what respects the Soviet proposal departed from the approach of a 30 per cent reduction advocated by the United States. He went on to say:

"We clearly need to know which armaments the Soviet Union proposes to reduce by 30 per cent, which by 100 per cent, and which by a percentage or amount in between". (ENDC/PV.129, p.30)

But Mr. Stelle knows perfectly well -- and we have already made this clear on a number of occasions -- that, with the exception of the strictly limited, agreed number of missiles to which I referred just now, the Soviet Union advocates the destruction of all missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons -- regardless of their calibre and regardless of their range of action, whether strategic, operational-tactical or tactical, and of all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, all submarines and all artillery systems capable of firing nuclear warheads. In short, we propose that with the aforementioned single exception all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be destroyed in the first stage.

We have given the representatives of the Western Powers exhaustive clarifications regarding our proposal. So what really causes Mr. Stelle to be dissatisfied is not the lack or insufficiency of clarifications on our part, but the very essence of the Soviet proposals. Apparently he finds it difficult to imagine a situation in which all these deadly armaments would be destroyed.

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Thirdly, the Soviet Union proposes that a limited number of missiles should be retained until the end of the second stage. On a number of occasions the United Kingdom representatives have tried to arrange things so that the destruction of the remaining missiles would be postponed until the end of the third stage. But we resolutely object to any attempt to postpone the time-limit for the destruction of the remaining missiles. Under the Soviet proposals, all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated by the end of the second stage and, consequently, the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war will be eliminated once and for all. States will no longer possess any nuclear bombs, or any vehicles capable of delivering them to their targets. By the end of the second stage the risks to which the Western Powers refer, in order to justify their insistence on an additional security guarantee, will have receded into the past.

Fourthly, the Soviet Union has given the necessary clarifications regarding control over the implementation of its proposal. In the Soviet draft treaty all disarmament measures are to be carried out under strict and effective international control. Accordingly, the Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control directly over the remaining missiles at the launching sites themselves (ENDC/PV.114, p.40). At the same time we consider that the number of launching sites should not exceed the number of missiles retained, and that all the launching sites should be destroyed by the end of the second stage of disarmament, together with the elimination of the missiles themselves.

Thus we have given the Western Powers all the clarifications which they requested and which -- according to their own assertions -- would enable them to determine their position in regard to the Soviet proposal for the retention by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of missiles, of the types and categories specified by us. This proposal of ours contains clear indications regarding the types and categories of missiles to be retained, the length of time for which they are to be retained, and the Powers to which this measure is to apply. We have provided the Western Powers with exhaustive clarifications regarding the approach we propose for determining the number of missiles to be retained, and we have explained the basic criterion to be used as a guide in doing so. In spite of all these exhaustive clarifications which we have given, the representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee go on asking us exactly the same questions over and over again,

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as if they had received no clarifications from us at all. One thing is clear. If the Western Powers desired agreement, this question would easily have been settled long ago, and the way would thereby have been opened to the achievement of agreement on the measures for the first stage of disarmament.

But, as the discussion has shown, the Western Powers reject our compromise proposal and insist on their plan for a percentage reduction in armaments which, on the one hand, does not eliminate or even in any way reduce the danger of a nuclear missile war and, on the other hand, is aimed at securing military advantages for the United States.

What arguments have been put forward against our proposal by the Western representatives in the course of the discussion? Their first objection amounted to an assertion that the implementation of the Soviet proposals would result in upsetting the military balance between East and West. Thus, at our meeting last Wednesday 22 May the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said that the Soviet proposal seemed to involve a radical and sudden change in the overall defence structure of the countries concerned (ENDC/PV.135, p.29). Let us have a look at the substance of this question. The intention of the Soviet Union, in proposing the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the very beginning of the disarmament process, is to create a situation which would preclude any possibility of waging a nuclear war. The retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed and, moreover, strictly limited number of missiles of a specified category and specified types would not essentially change the situation. The missiles to be retained are not intended to serve the purposes of war or aggression, but to provide an additional guarantee for the security of States. The elimination of the danger of a nuclear war, with which the peoples are at present threatened, cannot represent a threat to the security of any State. The destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States will create an identical situation, from the point of view of security, both for the States belonging to NATO and for the States united under the Warsaw Agreement. In this respect, the situation will be the same for everyone.

The Western Powers categorically object to the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all foreign bases on the territories of other States. The representatives of the Western Powers are trying to create the impression that the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and foreign military bases would open up possibilities for the Soviet

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Union to attack Western countries, whereas the NATO countries, deprived of United States bases, would, it is alleged, be left defenceless in the face of the Soviet threat. But what means could the Soviet Union use for such an attack, if we take the hypothesis you used in your statement? At the present time the main weapon for waging war is the nuclear weapon. But, under the Soviet draft treaty, nuclear weapons will be neutralized, at the very beginning of the disarmament process, by the elimination of the delivery vehicles. It will no longer be possible to deliver nuclear bombs to their targets with missiles, aircraft or submarines, since all means of delivering nuclear weapons will have ceased to exist.

The Western Powers assert that aggression could be committed with conventional armaments. But, under the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament, (ENDC/2/Rev.1) the inordinately inflated armies of the present day, which could be used as a weapon for a war of aggression, are to be substantially reduced in stage I. We propose a sharp reduction both in the strength of armed forces and in the number of armaments, a much greater reduction, in fact, than that proposed by the United States and its Western partners who clamour so much about the danger to the West from the large, superior armed forces of the Soviet Union. Under our proposals, the strength of the armed forces of the Soviet Union is to be reduced to 1,900,000 by the end of stage I, and the strength of the armed forces of the United States to become the same. As regards the level of the armed forces of other States, we envisage lowering this level in such a way as to ensure a substantial reduction in the size of large armies. The question arises: why, then, do the representatives of the Western Powers assert, contrary to the real situation, that the implementation of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage of disarmament would give the Soviet Union and other socialist countries an advantage over the Western Powers? It is obvious that assertions of this kind are absolutely groundless, and do not correspond with the facts or with the actual situation. It should be added that the withdrawal of the United States armed forces from Europe would not at all mean that the United States would not, in case of need, be able to return to Europe. Even if, in some hypothetical emergency situation, the United States should need to send its troops back to Europe, this could be done much more easily than in the years of the First and Second World Wars, and even more easily than at present, since the destruction of missiles, bomber aircraft, surface warships and submarines capable of delivering nuclear weapons would mean that the sea and air routes and lines of communication between the United States and Europe would be safe and practically invulnerable.

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Thus, if one adopts a realistic attitude in evaluating the substance of the Soviet proposals, one is bound to acknowledge that after the completion of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage of disarmament, the existing balance of forces in the world and, in particular, on the continent of Europe, will not be changed to anyone's advantage, but that international security will be strengthened many times over.

In speaking against our proposal, the Western Powers frequently refer to questions of control. They are trying to create the impression that the control measures proposed by us are inadequate, that there must be verification of the remaining armaments, and that international inspectors should be allowed to roam all over the territory of a country.

In our statement on 15 May we showed that, from the standpoint of the interests of disarmament, the question of control of this kind does not arise at all (ENDC/PV.132, p.6 et seq). The implementation of the disarmament measures envisaged in the Soviet draft treaty, in conjunction with effective control measures, will give all States the firm assurance that no-one is threatening their security.

The Western representatives have tried to discover alleged contradictions in the arguments we have put forward. Mr. Stelle, for instance, has tried to refute the argument that, if the Soviet disarmament plan is implemented, no State will be able to pursue a dual policy, disarming on the one hand and preparing for a world war on the other.

But how can a State prepare for war when it will be obliged, under the supervision of international inspectors, to destroy all missiles, bomber aircraft and warships, and also to eliminate the production of these armaments? Can a State, engaged in a disarmament process of this kind, unleash a war? Finally, can any State which has dismantled its war machine to a considerable extent and is converting the greater part of its existing war industry to peaceful needs, expect to succeed in re-establishing its military potential somewhere in secret, re-building missile and aircraft factories, constructing shipyards and docks and so forth? Such fantastic assumptions of Mr. Stelle appear to us to be extremely unconvincing and, I would say, ludicrous.

Mr. Stelle has said that it is not clear to him why the Soviet Union refuses to agree to control over the remaining armaments, if as a result of the implementation of the Soviet proposals the danger of a nuclear war is eliminated in the first stage. But Mr. Stelle knows perfectly well that in the Soviet proposals the elimination of nuclear weapons is postponed to the second stage of disarmament, and that in the first stage

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conventional armaments are not to be destroyed, but merely reduced. In these conditions, control over the remaining armaments would amount to undisguised espionage and military reconnaissance, which the strategists of the Pentagon and the NATO military bloc have long been trying to secure.

It would be those legitimate military secrets to which our Swedish colleague, Baron von Platen, referred some time ago when he said that they should not be revealed at the very beginning of the disarmament process.

The position of the United States of America, as it has emerged in the course of the past discussion, clearly shows that the United States does not want disarmament and is blocking any attempt to reach agreement. In substance, its disarmament programme can be reduced to the following points.

First, the United States is prepared to accept only such disarmament measures as would give it military advantages over the Soviet Union;

Second, it envisages maintaining the threat of a nuclear war throughout the whole disarmament process;

Third, the United States and other Western Powers are trying to preserve the military power of NATO;

Fourth, the United States refuses to eliminate its military bases on foreign territories;

Fifth, the United States refuses to carry out any radical disarmament measure on the pretext that they would involve changes of a qualitative nature in the existing structure of the United States military machine.

Throughout the whole disarmament process the United States is trying to preserve its war machine intact, together with nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles and foreign military bases. In the opinion of the United States representatives, this kind of world -- armed to the teeth -- is to exist throughout the process of disarmament. But will this be disarmament? Everyone realizes, of course, that this is not disarmament but a travesty of disarmament. We have heard repeated assertions by the Western representatives that they are anxious for general and complete disarmament. But these assertions must be judged in the light of actual facts, and in the light of the policy pursued by the Western Powers. And the actual situation is that at the Geneva negotiations the United States is in fact opposing the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and is

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preventing the reaching of an understanding. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, at the NATO session in Ottawa the Western Powers headed by the United States have been reaching agreement to intensify their military preparations still further, to establish a NATO multi-national nuclear force, to give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons, to increase their military budgets, to extend the nuclear and conventional armaments race and so on and so forth.

In our past discussions we have heard the view expressed that for the sake of reaching agreement it is essential to make concessions. The Soviet Union took an important step forward to meet the Western Powers, when it gave its consent to the retention of a limited, agreed number of missiles by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1, art. 5). But this was not followed by any corresponding steps on the part of the United States. We have not seen any such steps. It should be clear to everyone that the achievement of an agreement on disarmament is in the interests not only of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and the non-aligned States, but also in the interests of the Western Powers and their peoples.. And if progress in our negotiations depended on the degree of cogency of the arguments put forward by one or the other side, or on the extent to which the measures proposed by them corresponded to the task of eliminating nuclear war, or at least to a real reduction of the threat of a nuclear missile war or to the task of lessening tension in international relations, then undoubtedly we would have made considerable progress in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Unfortunately, as can be seen from the facts, the Western Powers have come to the negotiations not in order to reach agreement on disarmament and measures to lessen international tension, but in order to delay, hamper and even bring to a complete standstill any movement in that direction.

All this arises from the fact that, since the days of Truman, Acheson and Dulles, the Western Powers have been involved in a certain policy, the policy "from a position of strength", which they are still persistently following in the post-war period. The armaments race and the intensive war preparations which are being carried out by the Western Powers are intended to ensure the material basis for carrying out this policy. Everyone understands that the policy "from a position of strength" is irreconcilable with the policy of peaceful co-existence or with the policy of disarmament. When the Western Powers accept the policy of peaceful co-existence not only in their statements but in

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their actions too, when they abandon the policy "from a position of strength", when they decide to take the path of disarmament, then we shall have some progress and it will not take us long to reach agreement on disarmament. Meanwhile the Western Powers are approaching the disarmament negotiations not only with the idea of war but with specific plans for preparing for war. The attitude of the Western Powers to disarmament measures is determined by this policy of theirs. The more serious a disarmament measure is, the greater is the resistance we encounter from the Western Powers; the less effective and weaker a disarmament measure is, the greater is the favour shown towards it by the Western Powers. And, finally, if a measure proposed here is altogether trivial, then the Western Powers support it with enthusiasm.

It is essential to reach agreement on the main issue, to reach agreement on the elimination of delivery vehicles. This would undoubtedly reduce considerably the threat of a nuclear missile war even in the first stage of disarmament, because everyone understands that without nuclear weapons it is impossible to wage a modern war, and for all the more reason it would be impossible for an aggressor to count on success if he should try to start one.

In the course of the discussions on the Soviet proposal, the Soviet delegation and the delegations of other socialist countries have more than once appealed to the Western Powers to approach the consideration of the Soviet proposal with a sense of serious political responsibility and in a business-like manner. We have stated that we are ready to consider their amendments to our proposal; but unfortunately, there has so far been no response from the Western Powers. Nevertheless we hope that the Western Powers will think better of it and will cease to reject proposals aimed at real disarmament.

If we can reach agreement on the main issues, that is, on the destruction of all means of delivery, except for a small, strictly limited and agreed number of delivery vehicles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage, and on the simultaneous elimination of all foreign military bases on the territories of other States and the withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories, then the relatively minor differences still remaining between us and the Western Powers, in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments and their production, will undoubtedly be overcome.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Western Powers suggest that the Soviet proposals for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with the exception of an agreed number of missiles, should be referred for further consideration to the co-Chairmen. We are prepared to continue the discussion of this question at meetings of the co-Chairmen, so as not to neglect any opportunity in our efforts to reach mutual understanding with the United States side. We hope that the United States will reconsider its negative position on this matter, thus enabling us to move forward towards a solution of the most important problem of these days -- the elimination of the danger of a nuclear missile war.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): It is my intention today to seek to move our discussions forward to the next item on our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3). We have just heard our Soviet colleague say that he agrees that items 5(b) and 5(c) should now be referred to the co-Chairmen, and the hope that he expressed for progress on them was, perhaps, the most agreeable part of the speech to which we have just listened.

Before I go on to deal with the new item I feel that I must just make a passing comment on one or two of the points raised this morning. Representatives generally are, I think, anxious and ready to move on to another subject because we have had repeated again and again here arguments which have become stale through repetition, and despite the agreeable manner in which the first two speeches were delivered to us this morning the representatives who made them will forgive me for saying that they contained nothing remarkably new in relation to our thoughts. Therefore, I shall not spend much time on them.

I would merely comment in relation to the speech of our Czechoslovak colleague that he did at one stage say that the theory of the balance of armaments had "nothing to do with disarmament" (supra, p. 8). That was the phrase I think he used. What I would say to him is that there exists at the present time a precarious balance of power. I have said this before. Whether we like it or not, it exists, and it is a balance of deterrence. What the agreed principles (ENDC/5) lay down is, in principle 5, that actual reductions of armaments shall be balanced so that neither side gains an advantage. Therefore, if we have an uneasy balance now, and if we are going to reduce by measures which give neither side an advantage, we shall in fact be keeping -- at whatever level of disarmament we reach -- some balance of armaments, however we choose to describe them.

For that reason I do beg to differ from our Czechoslovak colleague in the statement he has made. I think it is important that we realize that, whether we like it or not,

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we have to face this if we are all to have at least as much security as we have today. Many of us do not like the present position, but if we were to have less security it would be intolerable, and therefore we have, in line with the thoughts expressed in the agreed principles, to see that this is achieved.

As for the speech of our Polish colleague, I liked best of all his remarks at the end when he said that Poland believed that agreement was still possible. (supra p.18) That is certainly the United Kingdom view also, and I believe there are many reasons why we have to continue our efforts until we have reached agreement on all these issues. There is the tremendous responsibility that weighs on us all to try to dispel the mutual fear that exists. There is also the tremendous economic problem -- if one puts it no higher than that -- imposed on States, and, as has been shown in discussions elsewhere, there are the tremendous advantages that could accrue to the world as a whole, and the help that could be given to under-developed nations, when we have succeeded in our work.

So I agree with the Polish representative that we must believe that agreement is possible and that we must seek to find the way. But throughout the speeches which preceded mine this morning we had, it seemed to me, the same themes we had had before in relation to the proposals for the liquidation of nuclear delivery vehicles, and it seemed to me again as I listened to them that there are two compelling reasons why it is very difficult to accept any of the general arguments that were adduced.

The first of those two reasons is the determination of the Eastern European States to seek completely to overload the first stage of a disarmament process. The agreed principles talk of the programme being

"implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits." (ENDC/5, para.4)

The agreed principles do not say we have to do the great bulk of our disarming in the first stage.

And as I listened to the speeches this morning, and in particular that of our Soviet colleague, it struck me again that there is a complete lack of realism here. If we are to make plans which are really effective, then seeking to overload the first stage is not going to help us forward. We all know just how grim and how terrible the thought of nuclear war is, but it will not be abolished merely by continually repeating that, or by seeking to put into the first stage a whole series of measures for which provision has not been made in advance and which it is not possible to verify effectively, when, at the same time, we have not prepared the world for a situation where there are no major forces

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in the possession of the major Powers, and where no effective peace-keeping forces have been established. All these things tie up with one another, and I do hope that in considering them in future we shall all keep that very much in mind.

Our Soviet colleague ranged over a fairly wide number of points. I do not propose to deal with all of them today because it would take too long. However, I felt I must protest gently to him when he told us (supra. p.21) that the Western Powers had stated that their position in relation to bases was that they need their overseas bases so that they may be better able to strike a blow at the Soviet Union. That was the way our Soviet colleague put it this morning. If I might try to re-phrase it for him to make it a little more real, and perhaps put it a little more felicitously, might I say that what in fact the Western Powers have said is that they need their overseas bases in the early stages of disarmament so that they may be better able to defend themselves from any prospect that the Soviet Union might attack them. It is just a slight difference of phrasing, but it means a great deal: I hope our Soviet colleague will take note of it.

If I might pick him up on a second point. He referred (supra. p.19) -- in words which I found quite extraordinary -- to the events in the Caribbean last autumn. I do not propose to dwell on them today, but when he told us about United States aggressive actions leading to the Caribbean crisis, then I thought he was really taking us into Cloud Cuckoo Land, if there is a Russian expression for that. He really took us into fantasy because, in fact, we all know the history of the Caribbean crisis. We know who brought about that crisis and we know who introduced the risk of nuclear conflict into a whole new hemisphere. Please do not let us have such distortions as that.

Our Soviet colleague also said that the Western proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, as of other things, and the refusal of the West to eliminate foreign bases in the first stage was not in accord with paragraph 5 of the agreed principles. I found that a very strange argument indeed because I could see no justification for it at all. Presumably the only justification would be if the Soviet Union itself had not a reasonable degree of similar armaments. But only just before that particular statement, our Soviet colleague said that the nuclear weapon was the main armament of the Soviet Union. That being so, reductions percentage-wise -- and of course the effect this would have on overseas bases, as we have indicated before -- must have a relative equality. If, in relation to particular armaments, the Soviet Union feels that this is unfair, let it put forward its proposals to take account of this. But it is not true in general to say that the Western proposal is not in accord with the agreed principles. I would say it is far more in accord with the agreed principles than the proposals we have had from the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am sorry to hear our Soviet colleague say so emphatically (supra. p.28) that in no circumstances could the Soviet delegation envisage the Gromyko (A/PV.1127 provisional p.38-40) proposal as going on into the third stage rather than the second, because if he adheres to that attitude it is very difficult to see how that proposal can lead us forward. I have reminded him of the relevance of it to the setting up of international peace-keeping forces, and he has in no way attempted to answer me on that.

But what is most difficult of all, of course, is the whole complex of facts relating to verification. The Soviet representative has in no way told us how we would have complete ability to verify that there were no clandestine missiles retained. It is true he has told us that there would be control of the declared missiles on the launching pads, but he has not faced up to the question of clandestine missiles either today or on any previous occasion. And so really this is a basic problem in relation to the matter which we are now just leaving, but I want to touch on it in relation to the next item so I will not go into it further now.

I was sorry that in the last stages of our Soviet colleague's speech he repeated the old charges about the West not being sincere in its efforts. (supra. p.32) We are indeed sincere and we wish to draw our Soviet colleague into detailed discussion of so many of the aspects of disarmament: I only wish we could succeed more readily.

Then he tells us that the flimsier the proposal is, the greater the support it gets from the West (supra. p.34). That is unrealistic in the extreme. Is he really suggesting that a proposal which embodies the destruction of one-third of all the destructive power in the world today in the first stage is flimsy? If it is flimsy, then that is a form of words that I do not understand. I tell him that the Western proposals are realistic and it is in that sense that I commend them to him and ask him again to look at them without prejudice and to see why it is not possible for the Soviet Union to go along with us in this.

I felt compelled to make those comments on the speeches that had been made this morning, but I am glad that this subject is now being referred to the co-Chairmen and I hope we may make progress on it.

Although it is getting late, I should be grateful if my colleagues would bear with me while I make a few comments on item 5(d). I ask them to do so because I shall probably not be in a position to make this speech next week, and I should like to have it on record as the United Kingdom view on this very important item to which we are now moving.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

We have been concentrating on matters relating to nuclear delivery vehicles, but now, as we move on to the item 5(d), we shall have to concentrate on the other essential component of a nuclear weapons system, that is, the nuclear warheads themselves. We shall have to examine some of the very difficult problems involved in eliminating and, if possible, in verifying the elimination of those warheads. I have dwelt on this in the past but it is an essential aspect to which I must return, and so I want to talk about verification in this field. But in doing so I hope it will become abundantly clear to the Committee why the nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the West for stage I are important, sound, realistic and, above all, feasible at an early stage in the disarmament process. I hope it will also become clear why any so-called radical measures which fail to take into account the essential verification problems will necessarily fail to provide us with any solution of the question now under consideration.

My United States colleague outlined at some length on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, pp. 32 et seq.) the nuclear disarmament measures which the West proposes for stage I. There is therefore no need for me to repeat what he said on that occasion except to remind the Committee that four major measures are envisaged: (i) a cut-off in the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons; (ii) a reduction in nuclear stockpiles through transfers of substantial quantities of weapons-grade U.235 to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons; (iii) States would undertake obligations with regard to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons; (iv) a nuclear test ban treaty, if it has not been achieved by that time.

Although we are primarily concerned at present with stage I measures, we must clearly set them in the broad framework of the problems -- particularly verification problems -- involved in the complex field of nuclear disarmament as a whole. Stage I measures cannot always be considered in complete isolation from stage II and stage III measures. In any case, as my United States colleague reminded the Committee on 15 May, one of the Western stage I nuclear disarmament proposals is the creation of a group of experts to discuss the means for and to resolve outstanding questions relating to the future reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles in stages II and III (ENDC/PV.132, p. 37). The Committee will recall that Mr. Stelle suggested at the same meeting that such technical studies could begin here as soon as delegations were prepared, and therefore need not necessarily await signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom delegation endorses that suggestion. I thought it would, therefore, be helpful to remind the Committee of certain considerations which will be relevant to such technical studies and, of course, to our discussions on item 5(d) in the meantime.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

At the meeting on 15 May (*ibid.*, p.40) my colleague, Sir Paul Mason, reminded the Committee that the United Kingdom delegation circulated on 31 August last a working paper entitled "The Technical Possibility of International Control of Fissile Material Production" (ENDC/60). My colleagues and their Governments will by now have had an opportunity to make a thorough study of that document, which, as Sir Paul Mason suggested, could serve as one of the bases for our present and future deliberations. I hope that members of the Committee will come forward with their Governments' detailed comments on the United Kingdom working paper. Needless to say, my delegation will be glad at any time to answer questions, publicly or privately, which other delegations may wish to raise on any points arising out of that somewhat detailed and technical document.

The Committee will recall also that at our 82nd meeting on 7 September 1962 Sir Michael Wright referred to that paper and drew the Committee's attention to the conclusions set out in its paragraphs 64 to 75. Sir Michael pointed out that those conclusions treated separately the two fissile materials used in making nuclear warheads: plutonium and uranium 235. I do not propose to repeat what he said on that occasion, but I would urge the Committee to look again at his remarks, especially those on pages 38 and 39 of the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.82). In particular I would draw attention to the passage where he explained that, in view of the uncertainties involved in trying to account for past production of plutonium and U-235:

"the net result is that a control organization could not, by production accounting, guarantee that up to 10 to 20 per cent of stocks of nuclear weapons assembled by any given country from past fissile material production had not been concealed" (*ibid.*, p.39).

However, he went on to explain that the analysis in the United Kingdom paper (ENDC/60) was based on figures relating to the United Kingdom. He said:

"We do not know, and we have not tried to assess, how accurately it would be possible to account for other countries' fissile material production. We cannot therefore say whether our facts and figures and, of course, the conclusions based on them, would necessarily apply to other countries" (ENDC/PV.82, p.39)

I hope the Committee will agree that the technical analysis and conclusions of the United Kingdom paper could be broadly applied to other fissile material producing countries. I am sure that in this connexion it would be most helpful to learn the considered technical and scientific views of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this matter. Assuming that the facts and conclusions in our paper are not in dispute

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and that we are in agreement on the basic technical facts, we could then move forward and consider what nuclear disarmament measures it would be appropriate to include in each stage of our treaty on general and complete disarmament. Clearly, such measures will have to be related very closely to a realistic assessment of what is technically feasible from the point of view of verification. That is a basic attitude of the United Kingdom to many of the matters with which we are concerned here, and it applies equally to many of the points which the Soviet representative raised earlier this morning.

Assuming, however, that the Committee agrees on the technical issues involved in trying to account for fissile material production, I hope that during our forthcoming discussions my colleagues will bear in mind at least three basic propositions arising out of the analysis in the United Kingdom paper (ENDC/60). They are as follows:

- (i) We may have to recognize that, even after further detailed technical study, there will always be a serious margin of uncertainty in trying to account for past fissile material production.
- (ii) If so, we may have to face the fact, however unpalatable it is, that it will be possible for nuclear Powers to hide and retain significant quantities of both fissile materials for weapon purposes and, possibly, the nuclear warheads themselves.
- (iii) We may, therefore, be unlikely to be able to achieve complete, total nuclear disarmament until we can establish peace-keeping machinery which can be relied on to deal adequately and effectively with the threat to the security of States posed by the possibility of clandestinely retained nuclear warheads and fissile material for weapon purposes.

Those are really the hard facts of the situation. However easy it is to move from them into an emotional approach, those are the facts which we have to face.

Now I should like to take a look at those propositions in a little more detail.

First of all, let me remind the Committee that paragraph 39 of the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60) points out that, in our view, it would take at least eighteen months from the time when a control organization started its work before declarations by the nuclear Powers of their past production of fissile material could be checked and a balance-sheet drawn up. But, unfortunately, even when that process had been completed the control organization would be unable to guarantee the 100 per cent accuracy of its balance-sheet for past fissile material production. As paragraph 47 of the United Kingdom paper points out, we do not expect, even on the most optimistic assumption, that the control organization could certify that we in the United Kingdom, for instance, had not

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been able to retain and hide some 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the fissile material presented for inspection by the control organization. Moreover, our control over past fissile material production in the United Kingdom has been very tight and has been extensively instrumented, recorded and documented. Therefore we think it very unlikely indeed that the control organization would be able to guarantee that other countries had not hidden at least 10 per cent of their fissile material stockpiles. As paragraph 71 of the United Kingdom paper points out, it would not be surprising if the maximum possible violation in some cases could be even of the order of 20 per cent.

Now, what would this margin of uncertainty involve in terms of actual nuclear weapons? We all know that the majority of the fissile material so far produced in the world has in fact been intended for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 68 of the United Kingdom working paper points out that the total quantity of fissile material made for such purposes is now enormous. Let me quote some figures. According to the Soviet News -- a publication issued by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London, and one which I am sure has the approval of our Soviet colleague here -- Mr. Khrushchev told an audience in East Berlin on 16 January 1963:

"Foreign scientists and military experts estimate that the United States now has roughly 40,000 hydrogen bombs and warheads."

I would be the last to dispute any figures quoted by Mr. Khrushchev -- I would leave it to the United States representative to consider that one. However, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the United States Government submitted to the control organization extremely accurate declarations of past production of fissile material in the United States which -- using Mr. Khrushchev's figure -- showed that 40,000 hydrogen bombs and warheads could have been manufactured from such material.

So far so good. But unfortunately the control organization would still be unable to give any guarantee to the Soviet Government, for example, that there was not a margin of uncertainty of at least 10 per cent, for reasons I have given earlier. In other words, the control organization could not prove on these figures that the United States had not retained at least 4,000 -- at least 4,000 -- nuclear warheads.

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If members of the Committee dispute Mr. Khrushchev's figure, let us take another. It has been estimated unofficially in technical journals that the United States stockpile of highly enriched uranium 235 was some 300-350 metric tons a year or two ago. Incidentally, I believe that these figures were mentioned at the 1961 Pugwash Conference which I think was held at Stowe, Vermont. Taking these figures, a control organization could give no guarantee, after eighteen months' operation, that the United States had not retained at least 5 per cent of its stock of highly enriched uranium 235, in other words, 15 metric tons. I understand that that would probably be about enough to make 1,000 atomic bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima.

Weapons design has, of course, been improved since then, and fusion or thermonuclear devices have been introduced, so that the explosive power per kilogramme of fissile material is now much greater than it was twenty years ago. Besides the U-235 weapons there are, of course, many plutonium weapons of various designs. It would well be, therefore, that Mr. Khrushchev's estimate of weapon numbers is not far out. And let me add that the situation could be quite as dangerous for the West as for the Soviet Union. After all, Mr. Khrushchev declared in his speech, which I have just quoted, that "everyone knows that the Soviet Union too has more than enough of this stuff." I am not revealing any secrets if I say that our own United Kingdom stock of fissile material is not negligible.

My colleagues will be only too well aware of the formidable power, the tremendous power, which this represents throughout the world; 10 per cent of the present stocks of fission and fusion weapons are more than enough to obliterate the major cities of the world, and to obliterate them now several times over. The total weight of TNT exploded in the Second World War was of the order of 10 million tons. This can now be contained in one single fusion weapon.

It is the fear of thousands of such weapons being released which enforces not only the nuclear Powers but also, through the nuclear Powers, the rest of the world as well to avoid the outbreak of major war. Never before have human beings had such power under their control and, ironical though it may seem, it is in my view the existence of this power which is going to make the ultimate success of the work of this Conference inevitable. It is the case even now that the threat of nuclear war makes such a war highly unlikely; it is the threat of unleashing those thousands of weapons, each with such a terrifyingly high yield, which leads one to hope that they will never be released at all.

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I sometimes feel that people throughout the world under the stress of emotion -- which is understandable -- fall into the trap of saying, "Nuclear weapons are so appalling in their effect that we must abolish them altogether and at once", without thinking through the implications of what they are saying. If the abolition of nuclear weapons led to the outbreak of, for example, so-called conventional war, which would be far more terrible than the last World War, then that outcome itself is not one which any of us rational people here could pretend to welcome. That is why we must persevere with our efforts for general and complete disarmament in all its aspects, conventional as well as nuclear.

I can say quite firmly that Her Majesty's Government has no intention of seeing the present uneasy foundation of the security of our country and of the whole free world destroyed until some effective alternative has been established; and I believe we are not alone in that view.

I have mentioned this because I believe it to be important that all of us should realize that, when we come to consider nuclear weapons, no-one is going to be willing to take chances. That is a fundamental point of which I do wish our Soviet colleague would take a little more note. This may not be quite so vital in the conventional field, but neither nuclear side can contemplate with equanimity the possibility of one side having even a very small number of nuclear weapons with warheads when the other has none. It is for those reasons that we in the United Kingdom regard the fissile material problem as crucial, and why we have tabled the paper to which I have been referring.

Our experts in the United Kingdom cannot at present offer any technical solution of the problem of how to guarantee 100 per cent verification of past production of fissile material. Frankly, we do not at present see how a control organization could prove conclusively that a given nuclear Power had not clandestinely retained any nuclear warheads or fissile material for weapons purposes. That is why I have suggested that we may have to accept the fact, depressing though it may seem at first sight, that there will continue to be a small but significant margin of uncertainty in trying to account for past fissile material production, however accurate and however stringent the measures taken by a control organization. Unless the Soviet Government or any other government can show us that the difficulties we have experienced in the United Kingdom in trying to account for past fissile material production do not apply to such production elsewhere,

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then I would ask the Committee to face realistically the conclusion which I have just drawn. If of course our Soviet colleague, for example, can show us that these difficulties are not present in trying to account for Soviet past production of fissile material, then I am quite certain that this Committee will wish to examine the appropriate technical data which no doubt our Soviet colleagues will provide. My own delegation and, I am sure, other delegations will welcome and will be very glad to study with the keenest interest any technical arguments which, for instance, would invalidate the statement made in 1955 by Mr. Malik on behalf of the Soviet Government to which I have previously referred. May I just remind the Committee of what Mr. Malik said on that occasion:

"... peace-loving peoples are most apprehensive with regard to the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in respect of which the institution of international control is particularly difficult.

"This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials and, moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that States having establishments for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons ..." (DC/71, Annex 15; DC/SC1/26/Rev.2 p.23)

He went on to say:

"Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise attack on peace-loving States." (ibid., pp. 23,24)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

That is what the representative of the Soviet Union said in 1955, and it seems fairly conclusive when considered in relation to what I myself have just been saying.

Where can we proceed from this position? Let me say at once that the fact that we do not see any technical solution to this problem, although it is depressing, need not give rise to complete pessimism. In my view agreement by this Committee to establish controls such as those outlined in the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60) -- even if those controls could never be completely effective -- would nevertheless be an extremely important and significant step forward in our negotiations.

That, I think, logically brings me to the third proposition which I submitted to the Committee, namely, that we are unlikely to be able to achieve total nuclear disarmament until we can establish adequate and effective peace-keeping machinery. In this connexion perhaps I could remind my colleagues again of what Sir Michael Wright said on 7 September 1962. He said that, first,

"it would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved unless corresponding measures of adequate verification had been agreed upon and were implemented pari passu. Indeed, to do otherwise would be a clear breach of the joint statement of agreed principles". (ENDC/PV.82, p.41)

He went on to say that, secondly, in view of the technical problems inherent in trying to establish 100 per cent effective verification measures in regard to past production of fissile material,

"it would be entirely unrealistic to suppose that complete nuclear disarmament could be achieved before some steps towards adequate peace-keeping arrangements had been made." (ibid.)

Then Sir Michael suggested that

"No state can be expected to accept, as a direct result of disarmament, what it regards as a less reliable form of security than it enjoys at present." (ibid.)

I have said that at present it may be an uneasy security we enjoy, but we all know the position at present and we need to be reassured in relation to any new proposal.

Sir Michael went on:

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"In building the organization of the disarmed world in which we plan to live, the creation of better peace-keeping arrangements is an absolute essential part of the structure." (ibid)

Lastly, the character of these peace-keeping arrangements will depend to a very large extent on the adequacy or otherwise of such nuclear disarmament verification measures as may be agreed upon by this Committee.

May I remind the Committee once again that we may have to face the fact -- harsh as it undoubtedly is -- that even if we were to agree to all the control measures suggested in the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60), those measures in themselves are unlikely to provide 100 per cent security for any Power, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. A control system which was not 100 per cent effective could lead to a potentially dangerous situation in a world where total nuclear disarmament was supposed to have taken place and where adequate and effective peace-keeping machinery had not been established. It seems to us highly unrealistic to suppose that any nuclear Power will be prepared or could be expected to give up entirely its present source of security unless that security can be adequately safeguarded by alternative and equally effective international peace-keeping machinery. In our view, such machinery would have to be sufficiently effective to deal with, among other things, a situation in which the security of one or more States was threatened by the retention by another State or States of some -- I repeat some -- weapons grade fissile material from either their current or, even more serious, from their past production.

I have made these remarks this morning not because I am any less anxious than other members of the Committee to bring about total nuclear disarmament, and to bring it about as soon as practicable, but because I believe this Committee must face facts realistically and must draw realistic conclusions from them. I do not propose, to say more today on this vital question of peace-keeping machinery. Of course I shall wish to revert to it at the appropriate time when we come to it on the agenda, and I shall want to consider in greater detail the whole character of peace-keeping arrangements in a disarming and disarmed world. But it was essential to relate it to what I was saying this morning, just as it is essential to relate it to the proposals our Soviet colleague was referring to earlier this morning. I find it depressing that we do not get a more

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realistic idea in the mind of our Soviet colleague of the need of international security to take the place of the national basis of security. If we were to do so, I would be very happy indeed, because I think it is an essential aspect of the whole problem.

May I stress in conclusion that my delegation is anxious to discuss all these problems with all delegations, and particularly with our Soviet colleagues? We shall be most interested to hear their detailed ideas of just how this very difficult task can be accomplished. We must seek agreement on an orderly and balanced programme of nuclear disarmament and one which will permit a start to be made at the earliest practicable date. That should be the hope of us all, and I hope we can proceed to it at an early date.

I apologize for having kept my colleagues late, but I did wish to give my thoughts on this particular subject at this meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The last speaker on the list is the representative of Italy, but in view of the late hour he has informed me that he would not take the floor today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-eighth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Christov, Minister Plenipotentiary and Representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 31 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.